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Carolyn J. Heinrich
The Performance of 
Performance Standards
Incentives and accountability for 
government performance have become 
so central to contemporary government 
reform agendas across the globe that 
public management scholars have 
proclaimed a new era of “government by 
performance management” (Moynihan 
and Pandey 2005, p. 422). Elements of 
these recent reforms include establishing 
performance measures and standards 
to facilitate increased accountability 
to the public, pay for performance, 
organization-wide performance bonuses, 
and competitive performance-based 
contracting; reducing “red tape” and 
promoting more transparent management; 
and devolving government functions 
and incentivizing innovation. A core 
objective of incorporating performance 
measures and standards into public 
sector incentive systems is to create clear 
expectations for government performance 
(while loosening the reins of bureaucratic 
control) and allow for overt assessment 
of results. If they are to be more than 
data collection exercises, however, 
performance management systems 
also need to incorporate a means for 
incentivizing or rewarding individuals, 
teams, or entire organizations for their 
achievements relative to performance 
goals. 
In the United States, performance 
standards systems and bonuses are (or 
have been) used in Food Stamps and 
welfare-to-work programs, employment 
and training programs, child welfare 
agencies and child support enforcement 
programs, Medicaid and SCHIP 
programs, and other social programs. 
Performance incentive systems in public 
bureaucracies are also advancing in 
Europe and other parts of the world, with 
some governments such as Australia 
and the Netherlands now implementing 
incentive systems with fully (100 
percent) performance-contingent pay and 
contracting arrangements (Finn 2008; 
Struyven and Steurs 2005) As the use 
of performance measures and incentive 
systems has expanded in the public 
sector, so has the number of studies 
calling attention to their challenges 
and unintended effects, although there 
is relatively little rigorous empirical 
evidence of their implications for 
government outcomes. 
Among the earliest introductions 
of incentive systems in government 
agencies was the Job Training Partnership 
Act (JTPA) performance standards 
system in 1982, described by Klerman 
(2005, p. 347) as one of the “most mature 
implementations of performance-based 
management.” It is also one of the most 
studied systems, in part because of the 
randomized experimental evaluation 
of the JTPA program that produced 
important information for assessing 
the performance of this performance 
standards system. Policymakers have 
looked to the results of these studies to 
inform and guide changes in the design 
and operation of performance standards 
systems in other government programs, 
as well as to improve these systems in 
the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) 
programs that replaced JTPA. 
At the same time, one of the 
motivations for assembling the research 
presented in our new book, The 
Performance of Performance Standards 
(published by the Upjohn Institute), 
is that despite decades of study and 
practice, some of the important lessons 
that have been learned do not appear to 
be refl ected in the current design and 
implementation of performance standards 
systems. Bevan and Hood (2006, p. 7), 
for example, describe the development 
and use of performance targets in the 
English public health care system, 
along with the perverse incentives they 
generated, as “hitting the target and 
missing the point.” 
It may be that some of the empirical 
evidence from past studies has not 
been effectively communicated or 
penetrated policymaking and public 
management circles deeply enough. Or 
it may be that some of the fundamental 
lessons have been ignored or deferred 
in pursuit of other objectives (political 
or otherwise). Or, as James Heckman 
and Jeffrey Smith comment, it may be 
that policymakers who have mandated 
such systems (and administrators 
involved in their implementation) have 
not fully appreciated the challenges of 
designing a performance management 
system that generates incentives for 
improving performance and impacts. 
For example, even if a government 
designed a performance management 
system that initially suggested a strong 
correlation between performance 
measures and desired outcomes, over 
time, its effectiveness may decline as 
program managers learn how to game 
the measures and other limitations of 
the measures and system design become 
known. 
The essays we present use U.S. 
employment and training programs as a 
“laboratory” for investigation. Drawing 
on a variety of data sources on these 
incentives systems, we explore how 
performance standards and incentives 
affect the behavior of public managers 
and agency employees, their approaches 
to service delivery, and ultimately, the 
outcomes for participants. Both the 
JTPA and WIA programs have allowed 
state and local administrators and their 
governing boards substantial discretion, 
within broad limits, to determine 
performance goals, standards, and bonus 
systems. This administrative fl exibility 
is refl ected in the range of incentive 
systems that states have implemented 
over time. It is this variation in incentive 
systems among states that serves as the 
grist for our empirical mill and is used to 
extract general lessons that can be applied 
on a wider scale to both existing and 
newly developing performance incentive 
systems.
In our investigation of formal 
incentive structures and organizational 
behavior within U.S. employment 
and training programs, we focus 
on the following questions that are 
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broadly applicable to any public sector 
performance management and incentive 
system: 
• How do performance standards 
and measures operate to include or 
exclude individuals with different 
characteristics in public programs? 
• How do performance standards and 
measures affect the types of public 
services offered and received? 
• How do the processes for setting 
standards and weights for 
performance goals and for recognizing 
and rewarding performance affect 
system incentives and bureaucratic 
responses?
• Are the performance standards, 
measures, and incentives effective 
in motivating bureaucratic behavior 
toward the achievement of program 
goals? 
• Do short-term outcome measures used 
in performance standards systems 
predict long-term impacts of programs 
on participants?
• What problems or unintended effects 
are associated with the design and 
implementation of performance 
standards systems in the public sector? 
• What other lessons do we learn from 
the implementation of performance 
standards systems and the variation in 
rules and guidelines governing their 
administration over time? 
In undertaking research to address 
the questions above, we were fortunate 
to have access to data superior in scope 
and detail to much of the data used in 
the existing literature or available on 
a regular basis for assessing program 
performance. Our research benefi tted 
from detailed longitudinal, microlevel 
data that were collected in the National 
JTPA Study (NJS) and through other 
administrative data sources. In addition, 
we collected and analyzed complete 
information about state-level variation in 
the JTPA and WIA performance standards 
systems. We show that state incentive 
systems are highly complex and differ 
widely across states and over time within 
states, and are not easily characterized 
by small dimensional summary measures 
as used in previous studies. This wealth 
of data, to which we applied a variety of 
analytical/empirical strategies, is essential 
in assessing the implications of features 
and changes in performance standards 
and incentive systems in different 
contexts and across time. 
The broad fi ndings and lessons that we 
draw from this research are as follows. 
First, individuals and organizations 
respond to incentives, but sometimes 
the responses are perverse. In the fi rst 
iteration of a performance standards 
system’s design, well-meaning designers 
of the system are unlikely to fully 
anticipate the responses of program 
administrators and frontline workers to 
system incentives, or the many possible 
ways they might infl uence measured 
performance without necessarily adding 
to (or possibly even detracting from) 
program value or impact. Incentive 
system designers will have to expect 
to regularly review and revise the rules 
and incentives they create if they want 
to avoid ineffi cient and unintended 
responses. 
Second, the short-term outcome 
measures that are commonly used in 
performance standards systems are 
only weakly related to the true long-run 
impacts of the programs. Researchers 
and policymakers have yet to identify 
performance measures that will promote 
key, long-term program objectives while 
simultaneously generating more readily 
available performance information for 
ongoing program management. This will 
continue to be one of the most vexing 
challenges for performance standards 
system designers for some time to come.
Third, the “cream-skimming” issue, 
or concern about the trade-off between 
effi ciency and equity in access to 
programs, has been overstated. While 
there is some evidence of a trade-off 
between serving the most disadvantaged 
and allocating program resources most 
effi ciently, it appears to be modest at 
best. Personal choices and informational 
constraints play a more important 
role in accounting for demographic 
differences in program participation 
than administrative discretion, and thus, 
program administrators should consider 
investing more in increasing awareness 
among the eligible population.
Clearly, demand on the part of 
policymakers or the public for greater 
accountability and a results-oriented 
government is not diminishing. 
The design and implementation of 
performance standards and incentive 
systems in the public sector will continue 
to be a dynamic pursuit, and it is our hope 
that the lessons distilled in this volume 
will have a role in shaping and speeding 
their evolution, as well as in ultimately 
improving government performance.
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